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Abstract. A rational interpretation is proposed for two ancient Indian logics: the
Jaina saptabha 
ng	, and the M	adhyamika catus.kot.i. It is argued that the irrational-
ity currently imputed to these logics relies upon some philosophical preconceptions
inherited from Aristotelian metaphysics. This misunderstanding can be corrected
in two steps: by recalling their assumptions about truth; by reconstructing their
ensuing theory of judgment within a common conceptual framework.
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1 Two logics?
A note on Indian logics is in order, to begin with. By a logic, it is ordinarily
meant a speciﬁc set of consequence relations between a set of premises Γ and
a conclusion B such that, for every formula A ∈ Γ, if A is true then so is
B. Formally: if v(A) = T then v(B) = T, where v is a valuation function
from a set of formulas to a set of truth-values. But such a modern deﬁnition
of logic as a set of rules for truth preservation cannot be properly applied
to ancient logics, including those from India. Rather, ancient and medieval
logics include epistemology in the scope of the formal discipline: how to
assess the content of a judgment isn't separable in Aristotle's Organon or
the Port-Royal Logic, for instance, and Indian logics are not an exception.
The epistemological import of Indian logics largely accounts for their
peculiar content; the metaphysical assumptions that underlie these Indian
schools of philosophy also results in speciﬁc theories of truth, and the main
aim of the present paper will be to give a formal presentation of the ways to
produce a judgment or predication such as S is P or S is not P (where S
is the subject-term and P the predicate-term). As a matter of rule, Indian
logics are about judgments and not about the sentences expressing them; we
will restrict our attention to two such cases: the Jaina saptabha 
ng	; and the
catus.kot.i from the Buddhist school of M	adhyamaka (literally, Middle Way).
As a general rule, the logics emerging from the Jaina and M	adhyamika
schools include both a theory of knowledge (about how to come to know
something) and a complementary theory of judgment (about how to express
this something known). Concerning the theory of knowledge, the nayav	ada
is a Jaina theory (v	ada) of standpoints (nayas) that includes seven kinds of
justiﬁcation for the truth of a sentence.1 Furthermore, a set of seven (sapta)
distinct judgments (bha 
ng	) can be made about a given topic. There is no
causal relation between the number of standpoints and judgments, however.
After all, the Greek skeptic Agrippa proposed ﬁve kinds of justiﬁcation while
1The seven kinds of justiﬁcation (nayas) include metaphysical, physical and gram-
matical features. These are the following: naigama-naya (non-distinguished standpoint);
sam. graha-naya (collective standpoint); vyavah	ara-naya (particular standpoint); r. ju-s	utra-
naya (momentary viewpoint); ±abda-naya (synonym viewpoint); samabhir	ud. ha-naya (ety-
mological viewpoint); and, ﬁnally, evam. bh	uta-naya (momentary etymological viewpoint).
For instance, the existence of an entity such as a pot, depends upon its being a particu-
lar substance (an earth-substance), upon its being located in a particular space, upon its
being in a particular time, and also upon its having some particular (say, dark) feature.
With respect to a water-substance, it would be non-existent, and the same with respect of
another spatial location, another time (when and where it was non-existent), and another
(say, red) feature. It seems to me that the indexicality of the determinants of existence is
being emphasized here. ([12], p. 132).
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sticking to an Aristotelian or bivalent view of judgments: either S is P or
S is not P, period. Rather, the number of the Jaina judgments is due to
their endorsement of a metaphysical pluralism according to which reality is
many-faceted and cannot be restricted to a unique predication. As to the
M	adhyamika school and its founder N	ag	arjuna (' 100 C.E.), they did not
present a competing theory of knowledge but advanced four (catus.) main
sorts of stances (kot.i) for any subject-matter.
As noted in [15], logic is not metaphysically neutral, and the diﬀerence
between the Jaina seven and N	ag	arjuna's four judgments is due to their rival
views of truth. Ganeri advances (in [6], p. 268) a relevant distinction between
three semantic views of truth-assignment, namely: doctrinalism, skepticism,
and pluralism. According to the doctrinalist view, it is always possible, in
principle, to discover which of two inconsistent sentences is true, and which
is false. This doctrine is related to Aristotle's two-valued logic, where only
two judgments can be made about any subject-matter (S is P, S is not P)
and only one of which comes to be accepted as true while the other is to
be false. Bivalence is the logical cornerstone of such a doctrine and entails
that every judgment is either a truth- or a falsity-claim, i.e. a statement.
Skepticism and relativism challenge this binary view in opposite directions.
According to skepticism, the existence both of a reason to assert and a reason
to reject a sentence itself constitutes a reason to deny that we can justiﬁably
either assert or deny the sentence, so that some sentences can be taken to be
neither true nor false. Conversely, the pluralistic watchword is to ﬁnd some
way conditionally to assent to each of the sentences, by recognizing that the
justiﬁcation of a sentence is internal to a standpoint; in this sense, one and
the same sentence can be taken to be both true and false depending upon
the condition under which its content is assessed.
We take these three doctrines of truth-assignment to be the crucial path
for a better understanding of Indian logics. While these have been dismissed
by Western thinkers, as having irrational or unintelligible outlook2, we
suspect this uncharitable preconception to stem from a narrow reading of
bivalence that takes Frege's modern logic as a standard for any meaningful
judgment. If so, the next sections insist upon the discursive and non-standard
form of judgments in Jaina and M	adhyamika logics: it is still possible to
preserve bivalence within these Indian theories and, thus, to preserve their
intelligibility, but only if such a bivalence is not deﬁned in Fregean terms and
reformulated as a question-answer game between speakers.
2Manifoldness in this context is understood to include mutually contradictory proper-
ties. Hence on the face of it, it seems to be a direct challenge to the law of contradiction.
However, this seeming challenge should not be construed as an invitation to jump into the
ocean of irrationality and unintelligibility ([12], pp. 129-30).
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2 Two opposite logics?
An intriguing feature of Jaina and M	adhyamika logics concerns their attitude
towards inference: the relativist doctrine of truth seems to entail a fully
inconsistent logic, whereas the skeptic doctrine of truth would entail a fully
incomplete logic. This means that, for any sentences A and B, B seems to
be inferred from every premise A in Jaina logic (say, J): A 6|=J B (for every
B); whereas no sentence B would be inferred from A in N	ag	arjuna's logic
(say, N): A 6|=N B. Parsons described in [14] these cases in terms of ultimate
eclecticism and complete nihilism, respectively3.
Is Jaina logic a formal system of eclecticism, and N	ag	arjuna's logic a
system for nihilism? This is not so, at least for one simple reason: nihilism
assumes that the premise A is accepted as true, while the coming exposition
of N	ag	arjuna's Principle of Four-Cornered Negation amounts to a denial of
every sentence including A. As to the Jaina logic, the role of standpoints
means that not every conclusion B can be inferred from A irrespective of the
context in which A and B are assessed. This entails that not everything can
be inferred from every given context, and Priest recalls this fact in [15] to
make his own dialetheist reading of Jaina logic immune from triviality. We
will return to this modern translation in Section 5.
Two Sanskrit notions will be introduced now, in order to throw some
light upon the Jaina and M	adhyamika ways of doing logic. The ﬁrst concept
is anek	antav	ada: this term means non one-sidedness and characterizes the
Jaina conditional view of truth, according to which the truth of a sentence
is never one-sided (ek	anta) but always depends upon the context in which it
is assessed. The second concept is prasajya pratisedha (see [5],[11],[13]); Mo-
hanta mentions this concept in [13] as a non-relational negation which some-
how corresponds to the contemporary denegation or illocutionary negation4.
3See [14], p. 141. Roughly speaking, eclecticism refers to the view that sentences of
two diﬀerent theories can be accepted consistently within a third embracing theory: T1
|= p, T2 |= q, T3 |= p and T3 |= q. This is not the point of Jainism. As to nihilism, it
refers to the belief that nothing is true. This is not the point of M	adhyamaka, either. The
diﬀerence between such nihilists and the latter could be made clearer by the diﬀerence
between atheism (negative assertion about the existence of God) and agnosticism (mere
denial about the existence of God).
4Illocutionary negation (denial, or denegation) has been deﬁned by John Searle in [19].
Let the speech act F(p) = I promise that I will come, where F is the act of promise and
p the sentential content I will come; then its locutionary negation F(∼p) is I promise
that I will not come, while its illocutionary negation ∼(Fp) is I do not promise that I
will come. Denial has been ordinarily rendered as a reversed turnstile a, in reference to
Frege's turnstile of assertion, while Keiﬀ views it in [11] as a merely failed assertion 0. In
both cases, denial occurs as an operator; in QAS, however, denial is an operand (a logical
value: the no-answer ai = 0).
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In contrast to the Jaina conditions for truth-assignment, the M	adhyamikas
defended the view that being dependent upon anything else is a suﬃcient
ground for denying a corresponding predication: S cannot be said to be P or
not to be P whenever S is not self-originated and is caused by another sub-
stance than itself. This refers to the two-truths doctrine and its distinction
between absolute truth (param	artha-satya) and conventional truth (sam. vr. ti-
satya) in the M	adhyamika's s	unyav	ada (doctrine of emptiness); we will see
how this doctrine leads to Ganeri's previous distinction between the pluralist
and skeptic conditions for truth-assignment. While the Jains favor a contex-
tual theory of aﬃrmation, N	ag	arjuna endorses a peculiar use of denial which
is to be rigorously distinguished from negative assertion and departs from
falsity-assignment. Thus, saying that S is not P results in an ambiguous
judgment between aﬃrming that the sentence S is P is false and denying
that S is not-P is true. From an Aristotelian or doctrinalist approach, af-
ﬁrming S not to be P and denying S to be P are synonymous with each other;
from a M	adhyamika or skeptic approach, however, P may be denied to be
true of S without being aﬃrmed to be false of S. Such a confusion amounts
to a harmful confusion between two sorts of Indian negations (pratisedha),
namely: the previous prasajya pratisedha and paryud	asa pratis.edha, which is
a relational (see [13]) or locutionary negation used by the later Navya school.
To sum up, Jaina and M	adhyamika logicians do oppose each other with
respect to their underlying criterion for truth-assignment. Given two op-
posite sentences S is P and S is not P, how to decide on the truth of
either? The main diﬀerence between Jainas and M	adhyamikas lies in their
answer to this question. Thus, Matilal claims (in [12], p. 129) that the
diﬀerence between Buddhism and Jainism in this respect lies in the fact that
the former avoids by rejecting the extremes altogether, while the latter does
it by accepting both with qualiﬁcations and also by reconciling them. It
is worthwhile to note that these opposite modes of truth-assignment also
foreshadow the contemporary opposition between semantic realism and anti-
realism: [22] and [23] notice that the Jains countenance a correspondence
theory of truth, whereas Siderits' comparison (in [21]) between N	ag	arjuna's
denials and Dummett's anti-realist semantics entails that N	ag	arjuna's con-
ception of truth doesn't transcend recognitional capacity by a given agent.
Before approaching this last problem about the relations between judg-
ments, let us consider the way to describe their various admitted judgments
within a clear and uniform formal semantics.
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3 Two many-valued logics?
One of the primary aims of the paper is to insist upon the dialectical nature
of Indian logics, i.e. their presentation in terms of speech-acts within an ar-
gumentative framework of questions and answers. To put it in other words,
each truth- or falsity-assignment proceeds by means of an intermediary act
of aﬃrmation and denial. Importantly, we take the asymmetry between the
pairs true-false and aﬃrmation-denial to be the key for a better understand-
ing of Indian logics. A number of logical techniques have been proposed in
the literature to catch the dialectical or discursive feature of Indian logics:
relational or possible-world semantics ([15]), dialogics ([8],[11]), and algebraic
or many-valued semantics ([6],[15],[18],[20])5.
In order to give a more ﬁne-grained description of Jaina and M	adhyamika
logics, we resort here to many-valuedness. Roughly speaking, the various
ways of making a judgment require the introduction of alternative logical
values beyond the doctrinalist values of truth and falsity. In the case of
Jaina philosophy, no judgment uniquely claims plain truth or falsity because
of its underlying one-many correspondence theory of truth: a given sentence
partly describes a fact following the perspective from which its content may
be described.6 In the case of N	ag	arjuna's Principle of Four-Cornered Nega-
tion, it will be shown that the assumption of bivalence cannot make sense
of the four negative stances together (see section 5). At the same time, the
metaphysical pluralism of the Jains does not entail that new truth-values
5Gokhale rejected the many-valued interpretation of Jain logic because, according to
him, a diﬀerence is to be made between epistemological and logical values. Thus: The
middle value designated by the term avaktavyam is therefore better understood as the
epistemic middle rather as the logical middle. It is closer to the middle truth-value called
`undeterminable' of Kleene's three-valued system than to the Łukasiewiczian third truth-
value called `indeterminate'. (. . .) As a result we can say that avaktavya is not the third
truth-value in the logical sense of the term, because it does not arise out of the violation
of the laws of logic such as non-contradiction and excluded middle ([7], p. 75). This
objection assumes that every logical value should have an ontological import, but our
purely algebraic viewpoint of logic does not require this and Belnap's four-valued system
is an instance where all the logical values have an epistemological import.
6Sylvan noted that Jainism apparently entailed a correspondence theory of truth (p.
62), so that the Jain values have an ontological import that diﬀers from Belnap's four
values in FDE: a sentence is true and false (in some respects), rather than told true and
told false. The diﬀerence between Jain and Aristotelian logic relies upon their underlying
ontology: the latter takes a true sentence to correspond to a fact, while the former reject
such a one-one correspondence between sentences of a language and states of aﬀairs of
the world. Thus Tripathi argued in [23] that Jainism is a realistic system. It not only
holds that reality is pluralistic, but also that reality is many-faced (anantadharm	atmakam
vastu). ([21], p. 187) The Wittgensteinian Bildtheorie should be strictly kept apart from
the Jain view of reality, consequently.
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should be devised in addition to the Aristotelian framework of bivalence.
Rather, these alternative logical values are various combinations of truth
and falsity inside the initial set of values T (for true) and F (for false).
In particular, the Jaina theory of sevenfold predication (saptabha 
ng	) re-
minds one of Belnap's system of generalized truth-values and Shramko &
Wansing's extension from 2 to n truth-values (see [3],[20]). Taking 2 = {T,F}
as a basic set and its two elements of truth and falsity, an extension from 2 to
4 results from its powerset ℘(2), that is the set of the subsets of 2. Thus 4 =
{{T},{F},{T,F},∅}, and Belnap symbolized the new combinations of truth-
values as {T,F} = B (for both true and false) and ∅ = N (for neither
true nor false) in its four-valued logic FDE (First Degree Entailment). The
same process can be applied indeﬁnitely, leading to a set of ℘(n) elements
for any n-valued logic (where n ≥ 1). Another such generalized set is ℘(3),
with n = 3 basic elements T, F and {T,F}. One of these generalized sets is 8
= {{T},{F},{B},{{T},{F}},{{T},{B}},{{F},{B}},{{T},{F},{B}},∅}. We
will see that the latter set can be made very similar to the Jaina semantics,
even though the odd number of the seven Jaina judgments may surprise at
a ﬁrst blush. Moreover, Bahm rightly noted in [2] that Indian logics are not
just formal combinations of truth-values but require a more comprehensive
reading of their original texts.
For this purpose, we propose now a conceptual framework to grasp the
rationale of Indian logics: a Question-Answer Semantics (QAS) that encom-
passes Belnap's generalizations and helps to account for the M	adhyamika's
dialectical logic of Four-Cornered Negation.
DEFINITION 1. A question-answer semantics is a model QAS = 〈M,A〉
upon a sentential languageL and its set of logical connectives©. It includes
a logical matrix M = 〈Q,V,D〉, with:
- a function Q(α) = 〈q1(α), ...,qn(α)〉 that turns any sentence α of L into
a speciﬁc speech-act (the sense of which is given by appropriate questions
about it);
- a set V of logical values (where Card(V ) = mn);
- a subset of designated values D ⊆ V .
It also includes a valuation functionA, such that the logical valueA(α) =
〈a1(α), . . . , an(α)〉 of V that characterizes a statement by giving an ordered
set of m sorts of answers to each question qi in Q(α) = 〈q1(α), . . . ,qn(α)〉.
This semantic framework results in a variety of logics L = 〈L , |=M〉 that
include an entailment relation in a model |=M such that, for every set of
premises Γ and every conclusion α in L , if A(Γ) ⊆ D then A(α) ⊆ D:
Γ |=M α.
A crucial diﬀerence with the more familiar logics is the meaning of the
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semantics values in QAS: each element {a1(α), . . . , an(α)} of A(α) is a basic
answer ai(α) (where 1 ≥ i ≥ n) with the symbol 1 for aﬃrmations (yes-
answers) and the symbol 0 for denials (no-answers). Let us call by the
general heading of logical value every such ordered set of answers, rather
than the customary truth-values: these values are a combination of yes-
no answers to corresponding questions, whereas not every question is to be
asked about the truth-value of a sentence in QAS.
Once the formal structure is set out for any question-answer game, let
us have a closer look at our two Indian logics at hand while attempting to
reconstruct their argumentative games.
4 Jaina's theory of seven-fold predication
It has been previously claimed that not everything can be derived from ev-
ery premise from a Jaina perspective: meaningfulness presupposes that a
restricted set of sentences can be accepted on the basis of certain premises in
a given language, while the remaining sentences of the language should not
be accepted. But the question is how the Jaina predications do make sense
in a consistent set of statements. In particular, the Jaina theory of seven-fold
predication (saptabha 
ng	) has been viewed as a challenge to Aristotle's logic.
According to Aristotle, the Principle of Non-Contradiction (PNC) is a
universal law of thought that cannot be violated without committing its
opponent into plain nonsense. It is stated in [1] as follows:
It is impossible for the same thing to belong and not to belong at the
same time to the same thing and in the same respect. (Book IV, 1005b19-20)
An instant reﬂection suﬃces to see that the Jains did not oppose to this
principle as it stands: their semantic pluralism relies upon a doctrine of condi-
tioned, relative or partial truth (sy	adv	ada). The Jaina philosopher V	adiveda
S	uri (1086-1169 C.E.) displayed the following set of seven predications and
witnessed the crucial role of sy	ad (arguably, or in some respect) in every
corresponding statement, where every predication expresses a conditioned
judgment about a sentence7:
7The saptabhan. g	 clearly departs from the Fregean logic of propositions, where a sen-
tence expresses a thought and refers to a unique truth-value. To the contrary, the seven
arguments of nayav	ada assume that the meaning of a sentence is context-dependent and
doesn't refer to some eternal entity as the True. Thus Matilal: Realists or believers in
bivalence (as Michael Dummett has put it) would rather have the proposition free from
ambiguities due to the indexical elements - an eternal sentence (of the kind W. V. Quine
talked about) or a Thought or Gedanke (of the Fregean kind) - such that it would have a
value, truth or falsity - eternally ﬁxed (. . .) We may assume that a proposition has an eter-
nally ﬁxed truth-value, but it is not absolutely clear to us what kind of a proposition that
8
(1) sy	ad asty eva: arguably, it (some object) exists.
(2) sy	an n	asty eva: arguably, it does not exist.
(3) sy	ad asty eva sy	an n	asty eva: arguably, it exists; arguably, it does not
exist.
(4) sy	ad asty eva sy	ad avaktavyam eva: arguably, it exists; arguably, it is
non-assertible.
(5) sy	ad asty eva sy	ad avaktavyam eva: arguably, it exists; arguably, it is
non-assertible.
(6) sy	an n	asty eva sy	ad avaktavyam eva: arguably, it does not exist; arguably,
it is non-assertible.
(7) sy	ad asty eva sy	an n	asty eva sy	ad avaktavyam eva: arguably, it exists;
arguably, it does not exist; arguably, it is non-assertible.
Each of these predications is a combination of three basic semantic pred-
icates (m	ulabha 
ngas)8, namely: assertion, or truth-claim; denial, or falsity-
claim9; and a third sort of judgment that Jains called by non-assertibility
(avaktavya). Before discussing the meaning of this third predicate #, it
follows from their combinations that the three basic statements are very sim-
ilar to the set 3 = {T,F,#} and its eight combined subsets in ℘(3) = 8
= {{T},{F},{#},{T,F},{T,#},{F,#},{T,F,#},∅}. The logical structure of
QAS brings out the two main features of this sevenfold predication, where
each component is to be rendered in terms of corresponding questions and
answers.
DEFINITION 2. A Jaina predication expresses an ordered answer A(α) =
〈a1(α), a2(α), a3(α)〉 to n = 3 basic questions Q(α) = 〈q1(α),q2(α),q3(α)〉,
such that q1: Is α asserted?, q2: Is α negated?, and q3: Is α non-
assertible?. There are m = 2 kinds of exclusive answers ai(α) 7→ {0, 1} to
each ordered question qi, where 0 is a denial no and 1 is an aﬃrmation
yes. This yields the following list of mn = 23 = 8 predications and their
counterparts in a Belnap-typed set 8:
would be. For it remains open to us to discover some hidden, unsuspected determinants
that would force us to withdraw our assent to it. ([12], p. 136)
8A judgment proceeds as a statement in which a semantic value is predicated of the
sentence. Gokhale claims for this higher-order level of discourse: A sy	at-statement, in so
far as it is a statement about a sense of a sentence, is a metalinguistic statement and not
an object-linguistic one. ([7], p. 80).
9Jain denial corresponds to the relational negation of the realists (paryud	asa
pratis.edha), by contrast to the M	adhyamika non-relational negation (prasajya pratisedha).
Accordingly, the denial of the second m	ulabha 
ngi (2) amounts to an act of negative asser-
tion or falsity-claim and stands for a commitment of the speaker about how the world is not,
whereas every disciple of M	adhyamaka typically endorses an attitude of non-committment.
9
(1) = 〈1, 0, 0〉 for {T} (2) = 〈0, 1, 0〉 for {F}
(3) = 〈1, 1, 0〉 for {{T},{F}} (4) = 〈0, 0, 1〉 for {#}
(5) = 〈1, 0, 1〉 for {{T},{#}} (6) = 〈0, 1, 1〉 for {{F},{#}}
(7) = 〈1, 1, 1〉 for {{T},{F},{#}} (8) = 〈0, 0, 0〉 for ∅
Each of the seven Jaina statements is an expression of single yes-answers
(ai = 1) among three possible ones, while the remaining no-answers (ai =
0) are left silent by the aﬃrmative nature of Jaina philosophy. The ﬁrst two
statements (1) and (2) mean that every standpoint is such that it makes a
given sentence true or false, respectively. (3) means that there are stand-
points for asserting the truth and the falsity of the sentence, while noting
that a standpoint does not make this sentence both true and false at once.
The internal consistency of the standpoints is stated in terms of successive
assertion and denial. (4) is the troublesome statement that the sentence is
non-assertible: although this semantic predicate seems to entail merely that
a given sentence cannot be asserted (made true), this should leave place for
strong denial (falsity-claim); but such a translation would collapse (4) into
(2), all the more that this third m	ulabha 
ngi is translated as a case of si-
multaneous assertion and denial. How can one and the same sentence be
non-assertible and asserted at once? We return to this point in the next
paragraph. The three remaining predications are combinations of the four
preceding ones: (5) and (6) mean that there are standpoints that make the
sentence true and non-assertible, or false and non-assertible. (7) is a com-
bination of the three basic predications such that the available standpoints
make the sentence true, false, and non-assertible.
The ultimate subset (8) doesn't appear in the list of the Jaina predica-
tions, however; hence the odd number of 8−1 = 7 elements. A combinatorial
account for this odd number of predications can be given as follows: there
is an inﬁnite number of particular arguments for any predication, and all of
these are classiﬁed among a set of seven general standpoints in the nayav	ada.
Now since any two diﬀerent kinds of standpoints may result in one and the
same statement of the sy	adv	ada, it follows from it that every sentence is
made (or claimed to be) either true, false or non-assertible by a variable set
of related standpoints. Therefore, there is always at least one standpoint
ai(α) = 1 for any sentence α. This entails that no sentence a can be an ex-
ception to these three basic judgments 〈a1(α), a2(α), a3(α)〉, and the answer
A(α) = 〈0, 0, 0〉 is made an impossible case.
As rightly noted by Priest10, no contemporary counterpart has been de-
10What are the semantic values of such compound sentences? Such a question is not
one that Jaina logicians thought to ask themselves, as far as I know. So we are on our
own here. ([15], p. 268).
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vised for the so-called Jaina logic: the Jains have not deﬁned any closed
formal language with a set of constants (connectives) and a closed set of
consequences. However, we can develop a plausible Jain logic within QAS.
DEFINITION 3. Jain logic is a model J7 = 〈M, A〉 upon a sentential lan-
guage L and its set of logical connectives © = {∼,∧,∨,→}. It includes a
logical matrix M = 〈Q;7;D〉, with:
- a function Q(α) = 〈q1(α),q2(α),q3(α)〉;
- a set 7 of logical values;
- a subset of designated values D ⊆ 7.
The cardinality of D and the diﬀerent matrices for© cannot be uniquely
determined without solving an intermediary problem: the meaning of the
non-assertible avaktavya in q3, by contrast to the two assertible vaktavya
(asti, nasti) that constitute expressible predications in q1 and q2. Each
ordered answer is a logical value from our many-valued perspective, and the
meaning of the semantic predicate non-assertible is crucial to determine
whether a positive answer to q3(α) results in a designated or non-designated
value11. For if A(α) = (4) = 〈0, 0, 1〉, then a1(α) = a2(α) = 0 and a3(α) = 1.
Assuming with Priest that a semantic value is designated if it expresses truth,
then a non-assertible sentence should be asserted to be at least true in order
to be designated. Is it so?
There are three main interpretations of avaktavya: (4.1) neither true nor
false, (4.2) both true and false, (4.3) none (taking to be granted that not two
of these can be accepted without extending the set of semantic predicates
from 8−1 to 16−1 = 15 elements)12. Given the crucial role of the number 7,
only one of these three possibilities is to be accepted as the third m	ulabha 
ngi.
11An alternative way consists in characterizing logical consequence in terms of an order-
ing relation between the elements of V , such that p |=J7 q if and only if A(p) ≤ A(q). See
[3],[22] about this process. An algebraic presentation for Jain logic is also given in [20],[22]
and results in a bi-and- a-half-lattice (a product of two Belnap's bi-lattices) with no lower
bound ∅ (〈0, 0, 0〉, in J7). But given that nothing seems to justify a speciﬁc hierarchy
between the seven logical values, we stick to the view of logical consequence as preserving
the designated value.
12Priest mentions the possibility of four-valued facets or m	ulabha 
ngi and a subsequent
15-valued logic in [15], in such a way that a sentence could be said to be either asserted
or denied, or both, or neither. Some other extensions of the basic predications have been
entertained in [2] for Jain logic, assuming it to be a positive counterpart of the catus.kot.i ;
these yield an extension from 4- to 8- and 12-valued logics, where a given standpoint is
more asserted (or not) than another. But such a probabilistic extension misleadingly
takes the doctrine of relative truth for a logic of partial truth-values. Gokhale argues
against this reading, because nayav	ada, as has generally been held, gives us a class of
`partial truths', whereas sy	adv	ada gives us a class of whole truths (or the whole truth).
([7], p. 74). In other words, each sentence is plainly true (or not) from each given
standpoint.
11
The ﬁrst interpretation is defended by [6], [7], and [9]; the second is urged by
[4], [12], and [15]. [15] and [18] admit both interpretations, while the third
interpretation is supported by [2] and [23].
Those who advocate (4.1) usually claim that the Jains always sustained
internal consistency or non contradiction as an unquestionable meta-principle
(paribh	as	a); this amounts to reject any case of simultaneous assertion and
denial from the same standpoint. Ganeri advanced in [6] a reductio argument
against the inconsistent interpretation, to the eﬀect that admitting a simul-
taneous assertion and denial would reduce the logical values (5) and (6) to
(4). This collapsing argument is rejected in [18]], insofar as it omits to take
the diﬀerence between the standpoints a1 and a2 into account
13. As a further
argument for (4.3), Tripathi claimed that the incomplete interpretation (4.1)
cannot square with the aﬃrmative basis of the Jaina predications14. The
latter means that any sentence can be made true from at least one stand-
point, so that no sentence can be said to be neither true nor false. Assuming
that aﬃrmative basis essentially refers to an act of assertion (the second
predication is a negative assertion), this implies that every Jaina predica-
tion asserts something about a sentence and cannot amount to a pure denial
without assertive counterpart15.
Conversely, Priest quotes some sources in support of (4.2) and takes them
13Ganeri's argument (see [6], p. 272) proceeds as follows: if avaktavyam means (4.2):
{T,F}, then the ﬁfth and sixth predicates yield (5.2): {T,{T,F}} and (6.2): {F,{T,F}},
respectively; now (5.2) and (6.2) are logically equivalent with {T,F}, given the triv-
ially twofold occurrence of T and F. Hence the adoption of (4.2) entails that (5) and (6)
conﬂate into (4), and the sevenfold predication is done. Ganeri's mistake is due to his
set-theoretical equation between sets and subsets of elements in V : this argument seems
to rely upon a conﬂation of two distinct standpoints: to state that p is asserted from
one standpoint and both asserted and denied from another standpoint doesn't entail that
p is merely asserted and denied, unless the crucial sy	ad is suddenly removed from the
meaning of a statement. But it could not be so, and Ganeri unduly commits the following
simpliﬁcation: p ∧ (p ∧ ∼p) = (p ∧ ∼p). ([18], pp. 63-4)
14To say that a thing neither exists (asti) nor does not exist (n	asti) is sheer skepticism,
and the Jaina would never accept it as a bha 
nga (predicate), and as one of the m	ulabha 
ngas
(primary predicates) at that. (. . .) What is worse, the interpretation of the avaktavya as
neither would make it indistinguishable from the fourth kot.i (alternative viewpoint) of
the M	adhyamika catus.kot.i, as also from the anirvanacan	ya (indescribable as either being
or not-being) of the Ved	anta. ([21], pp. 187-8). The argument is unconvincing, however,
given that the M	adhyamikas deny the neither . . . nor- position and don't aﬃrm it (see
Section 5); no confusion should arise from (4.1), accordingly.
15It could be objected to the view of a pure denial that any ﬁrst-order denial implicitly
contains a second-order assertion. Such an objection suggests that (4.3) includes a second-
order aﬃrmative basis (something like arguably, I assert that I don't assert anything about
p); see Section 6 about this.
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to mean a plausible admission of internal inconsistency16. The present paper
does not purport to have the ﬁnal word, but to note two main properties of
J7 that are established in [18]
17. On the one hand, the essential occurrence
of standpoints gives rise to a quasi-value-functional set of logical matrices for
J7 where the logical value of a complex sentence is partly determined by the
value of its components18. On the other hand, the incomplete or inconsistent
interpretation of avaktavya makes J7 quasi-equivalent to two famous many-
valued systems: Kleene's 3-valued logic K3 or Priest's 3-valued Logic of
Paradox LP, respectively. This can be stated by the two following theorems:
THEOREM 1. J7 is a paranormal logic that is either paraconsistent or
paracomplete. That is: for some sentences α, β of L , either α,∼α 6|= β or
6|= α does not entail |=∼α. J7 is paracomplete and quasi-equivalent withK3 if
and only if (4) is interpreted incompletely, and J7 is paraconsistent is quasi-
equivalent with Priest's 3-valued logic LP if and only if (4) is interpreted
inconsistently.
THEOREM 2. The matrices for the connectives © of J7 are invariant,
irrespective of the interpretation of (4). For every connective • ∈©, A(α •
β)icm = A(α•β)ics for every value of α and β including the incomplete (icm)
or inconsistent (ics) reading of #.
Apart from these technical results, it remains that no deﬁnite interpre-
16Priest adduces his usual argument for dialetheism, according to which some (but
not every) contradictions are true: What should seem to be meant by two things being
contradictory here is that they cannot obtain together. If [(4)] is both true and false,
then [p] and [∼p] are precisely not contradictories in this sense. ([14], pp. 271-2). Does
this mean that a diﬀerence should be made between possibly true and impossibly true
contradictions? A plea for possibly true contradictions has been made in [16], arguing
that (4.1) could mean that some standpoint aﬀords an evidence both for and against the
truth of p. But the latter explanation does not seem to match with the deﬁnite value of
a sentence in each standpoint, according to Gokhale (see note 12 above). This is why the
third interpretation (4.3) will be favored in the following.
17A quantiﬁed epistemic interpretation of the standpoints has been suggested in [17]:
each standpoint stands for a single belief within a community of agents, so that each
Jain statement about α is translated as ∃xBx(α) and reminds us of Ja±kowski's discussive
logic D2. Such a translation helps to explain the paraconsistent behavior of the Jains:
a set of inconsistent standpoints does not entail the truth of everything. Nevertheless,
it doesn't account for Jain realism (see note 6 above): a standpoint is not the mere
epistemic expression of a belief or opinion, but the genuinely ontological expression of a
facet of reality.
18Quasi-truth-functionality is due to the relative truth of standpoints. Two any sentences
α and ψ can be true from two diﬀerent standpoints; but there may be no standpoint
from which α and ψ should obtain at once, according to the existential translation of a
standpoint in [18]: v(∃xBx(α)) = T and v(∃xBx(ψ)) = T don't entail v(∃xBx(α ∧ ψ)) =
T, but v(∃xBx(α ∧ ψ)) = T or F. On the origins of quasi-truth-functionality, see [17].
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tation of avaktavya occurs in the literature and thus leaves the Jaina set of
logical consequences indeterminate. The next point is to see whether a mean-
ingful interpretation can be given to the third interpretation (4.3): what can
be meant by avaktavya, if it is neither both asserted and denied nor neither
asserted nor denied? For even though such an alternative reading prevents
Jaina logic from reducing to what Matilal called a mere facile relativism19,
a formal approach hardly makes obvious any statement beyond being either
true, or false, or both true and false, or neither true nor false.
For one thing, Bahm takes it (in [2]) to mean something like an incom-
plete thought: a sentence is non-assertible whenever no property P can be
completely predicated of S. But this is the essential feature of anek	antav	ada,
the partial truth for every standpoint of the Jaina nayav	ada: the cornerstone
of their pluralist metaphysics is that reality is an indeﬁnite collection of in-
complete perspectives. Assertion and denial are not categorical or one-sided
speech-acts, therefore, and the essential incompleteness of any sy	ad is likely
to undermine Bahm's explanation.
A more insightful reading seems to emerge in [23], where non-assertibility
is synonymous with non-distinction: a sentence is non-assertible whenever its
object S cannot be said to be properly P or not P. The diﬀerence is thus made
with the interpretation (4.2), in the sense that S is said to be both P and
not-P by including both opposite properties from one contradictory stand-
point. But again, Tripathi claims in [23] that the Jains fully subscribed to
the law of non-contradiction and would have refused any self -contradictory
statement20. A plausible account of being indistinguishable refers to the
Hegelian view of an internal or inclusive contradiction without exclusive op-
position between its terms. In support of this awkward view of contradiction,
it is worthwhile to note that most of the Jaina or M	adhyamika sentences are
about such metaphysical subjects as 	atman, Brahman and their being exis-
tent. One may be hesitant about the logical form of an expression like 	atman
19It also amounts to a view which announces that all predicates are relative to a point
of view; no predicates can be absolutely true of a thing of a thing or an object in the sense
that it can be applied unconditionally at all times under any circumstances. Jainas in this
way becomes identiﬁed with a sort of facile relativism. ([12], p. 133). Again, the crucial
role of standpoints clearly points out that the Jain logic is not a real challenge to PNC.
20No system of philosophy can aﬀord to accept self-contradiction as valid, because
if self-contradiction is accepted as valid without any qualiﬁcations, then there remains
no weapon for criticism, anything which is said will have to be accepted, because even
self-contradictories is valid. It is certain that the Jaina does not take leave of logic and
consistency; he does criticize others by pointing out self-contradiction. Every system of
philosophy has its contradictory which is regarded as false. This is why when a system
has to accept a synthesis of contradictories as valid, it has to invent one device or another
which at least seems to take oﬀ the edge from the contradictories. ([21], p. 188).
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is self-existent, where existence occurs as a predicate; but a more charitable
reading would be to the eﬀect that the subject-term S is elliptically said to
exist or to be as falling under a certain property P. Consequently, avaktavya
might mean that S is not any more P that non-P. But which sort of S could
be so indistinguishable as not only to cover both P and all its complemen-
tary properties, but also to cancel any distinction between these properties?
Tripathi mentions as a non-expressible sentence that which can be thought
but cannot be expressed (for want of a distinguishable set of properties)21.
Such a subject should be kept silent, according to the Wittgensteinian stance
that the limits of language are the limits of thought. (But our former refer-
ence to Hegel should give rise to a non-Wittgensteinian relationship between
language and the world.) While noting that Hegel's philosophy supported a
transcendental idealism and clearly diﬀers from the Jaina realism, a common
point between Jainism and the Buddhist trend of M	adhyamikas seems to be
their common rejection of logical atomism: reality is not a whole whose parts
would be objects and their properties, or at least not for some extra-natural
entities that transcend the empirical level of illusory data (pr	atibh	asika).
This plausible account of (4.3) will be pursued in the next section, because
it might make sense of N	ag	arjuna's radical skepticism.
To conclude our discussion of Jaina logic, Priest uses in [15] an analogy
with the cube to make sense of complete truth: every facet of reality is a side
of a cube, and reality is the collection of every such facet. But Jaina cubism is
such that the indeﬁnite number of facets turns the cube into a polygon even
more complex than Descartes' chiliagon. Just as Picasso wanted to catch a
conceptual reality by pooling diﬀerent perspectives of a character together
in one and the same proﬁle, the Jaina philosophy relies upon a plurality of
standpoints to grasp the essence of reality. A logical translation of this view is
given in [4]): plain truth amounts to a complete knowledge (prama	na) whose
expression in a complete judgment consists in the addition of the seven sorts
of predication. Is this a right way to describe the transition from partial to
complete truth22?
21Bahm's account must be distinguished from Meinong's famous example of a round
square, which has frequently been mentioned as a case of impossible object and a challenge
to PNC. A round square is an object that can be expressed (described) but cannot be
thought (imagined, or conceived mentally). To the contrary, the third interpretation of
avaktavya refers to something that can be thought but cannot be expressed. Is there
such a subject S that can fulﬁll this requirement? A Wittgensteinian reader would answer
negatively to this question, assuming that whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must
be silent.
22The following deﬁnition of plain truth is given in [4]: An object X can be viewed from
any one of the seven standpoints. However, since the totality of all these seven possibilities
comprises the pram	an. a-saptabha 
ng	 (complete judgment of the phenomenal world in terms
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An alternative account would be to state that a subject is completely
described when absolutely every particular standpoint is listed, rather than
just the seven kinds of argument from the nayav	ada. Such an exhaustive
completion is impossible, given the inﬁnite sort of standpoints that constitute
the proper description of any object.
A natural translation of (4) within J7 might be taken to be the twofold
answer yes and no to the third basic question: a3(α) = {1, 0}. But it is not
so, given that this third question is positively answered if the corresponding
sentence is inexpressible. No yes-no answer occurs in the Jaina question-
answer game, consequently: two diﬀerent questions can result in the same
answer or not, but no single question can be answered oppositely by yes
and no at once23. This is the gist of self-contradiction, and even the third
basic predicate of inexpressibility does not state it because non-distinction
does not mean an internal coexistence of opposite properties. These cannot
coexist, by deﬁnition.
Whatever the ﬁnal word may be about (4), we argue two things about
complete truth: it does not mean for a given sentence either to be assigned
a designated value (this is partial truth) or to be uniquely asserted and,
therefore, be given the logical value (1) in J7
24; partial truth is a suﬃcient
of seven possibilities), the disjunction, denoted by ∧, of these seven predications should
lead to a tautology. ([4], p. 186). In algebraic terms, the Jains would thus assimilate one-
sided truth with logical tautology and deﬁne the latter as the union of the seven elements
of V . That is: > = ((1)∪(2)∪(3)∪(4)∪(5)∪(6)∪(7)). This deﬁnition of tautology clearly
diﬀers from that of Priest's in [15] or J7 in [18]: a sentence is a tautology if it is designated
from every standpoint. But this is a deﬁnition of tautology in the conventional sense of
truth, by contrast to the aforementioned absolute sense of truth that uniquely leads to
a pram	an. a. One could wonder another thing, with respect to this deﬁnition of one-sided
tautology: does it correspond to the union of the seven kinds of standpoints or, rather,
should it collect the indeﬁnitely many particular standpoints that are included in each of
these seven kinds?
23Three levels of inconsistency can be graded within the framework of QAS: light incon-
sistency, or inconsistency from two diﬀerent standpoints: {{T},{F}}, i.e. ai(α) = aj(∼α)
= 1 (where i 6= j); mild inconsistency, or inconsistency from one and the same standpoint:
{{T,F}}, i.e. ai(α) = ai(∼α) = 1; and strong inconsistency, or inconsistency in one and
the same answer: {{T,∼T}}, i.e. ai(α) = ai(α) = {1,0}. The Jain anek	antav	ada embodies
a logic of light inconsistency; Priest's Logic of Paradox LP argues for a mild inconsistency
that corresponds to the inconsistent interpretation (4.1) of avaktavyam; but no counter-
part seems to occur for the strong inconsistency of self-contradiction, going beyond the
so-called impossible values of [20]. Indeed, strong inconsistency consists of non-empty
subsets including an element and its complement. Such a case is impossible even in a
combinatorial approach of semantic values, insofar as Priest's value {T,F} assumes that
T and F are not complementary to each other.
24Returning to the comparison with Ja±kowski's Discussive logic D2, the Polish logician
rendered each standpoint by the modality of possibility, ♦. Accordingly, any sentence α
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condition of truth-assignment for the Jains, while the skeptic M	adhyamikas
take complete truth to be a necessary condition for truth-assignment. Let us
now consider this skeptic logic within a question-answer game of QAS.
5 N	ag	arjuna's Principle of Four-Fold Negation
N	ag	arjuna's radical skepticism is summarized in hisM	ulamadhyamaka-k	arik	a,
where the ﬁrst verse includes four sentences (or lemmas) that are equally de-
nied by means of stances (dr.s. t.is, or kot.i) and result in the the so-called Princi-
ple of Four-Cornered Negation (thereafter: 4CN) or Tetralemma (catus.kot.i).
Thus:
(a) Does a thing or being come out itself? No.
(b) Does a thing or being come out the other? No.
(c) Does it come out of both itself and the other? No.
(d) Does it come out of neither? No.
How can N	ag	arjuna consistently deny all the four questions at once?
While noting that their content refers to the M	adhyamika's doctrine of empti-
ness (s	unyav	ada), a problem arises about the meaning of negation in the four
aforementioned answers. A tentative formalization of (a)-(d) yields the fol-
lowing, where a is a predication of the form S is P (with S for thing and
P for coming out iself) and ∼ is classical negation:
(a′) Not (S is P) = ∼(α)
(b′) Not (S is not P) = ∼(∼α)
(c′) Not (S is P and S is not P) = ∼(α ∧ ∼α)
(d′) Not (neither S is P nor S is not P) = ∼(∼(α ∨ ∼α))
Assuming that negation is the relational paryud	asa pratis.edha, the set of
four negative statements is clearly inconsistent: (b′) is equivalent with the
aﬃrmation α (by double negation), and this is patently contradictory with its
negation in (a′). Even more than for the Jains, it is commonly acknowledged
that the M	adhyamikas unexceptionably subscribed to PNC and cannot then
accept both (a′) and (b′). Furthermore, (d′) occurs as a denial of the denial of
the Principle of Excluded Middle (PEM), according to which every sentence
or its negation is true. But it clearly appears that the double denial arising
that is uniquely asserted (such that v(α) = (1)) is logically necessary because it is cannot
be but asserted, and it is not possible for it to be denied or taken to be non-assertible.
Thus v(α) = (1) means the same as α. This modal interpretation squares with the idea of
one-sidedness; however, the Jain view of pram	an. a still goes beyond such a logical necessity
(see note 22 above).
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in (d′) does not amount to an aﬃrmation of PEM, since (a′) and (b′) already
reject the aﬃrmation of both α and ∼α.
A way to avoid the contradiction (a′)-(b′) has been urged by Horn (in
[10]), who claimed that the negation of every sentential content should be
rendered as a predicate-term negation rather than a predicate negation25.
The distinction between predicate-term and predicate negation cannot be
expressed in a modern or Fregean logic, where predicate-terms and predicates
are collapsed into a unique function. By using term logic, (b′) should be
read as S is not-P, the contrary opposite of (a′). The conjunction (a′)-
(b′) results in a stronger relation of incompatibles, and Horn is right to say
that two contraries can be consistently negated without entailing any self-
contradiction. In this respect, an application of intuitionistic negation (¬α
for S is not-P) should ﬁll the bill and be preferred to the classical negation
(∼α for S is not P): ∼(∼α) becomes ∼(¬α), and the latter cannot be
reduced to a by the law of double negation.
Does this mean that intuitionistic logic should be seen as a proper logic
for 4CN? It is not, given that the last statement (d′) leads to another con-
tradiction. For since one of de Morgan's laws states that (∼α ∧ ∼(¬α)) is
equivalent to ∼(α ∨ ¬α)), how to claim with (a′)-(b′) that S is neither P nor
not-P: ∼(α ∨ ¬α)) while denying it at the same time with (d′): ∼(∼(α ∨
¬α))↔ (α ∨ ¬α) ?
The whole result turns 4CN into a case for radical skepticism: not only
does the speaker N	ag	arjuna ignore whether S is P or not, but he goes on
denying that he does ignore it. This troublesome stance has been noted by
Raju26 and accounts for the diﬀerence between Buddhism and nihilism, as
currently urged by a number of commentators: nihilism is the aﬃrmation
that nothing is real or can be known to be so; whereas Buddhism argues for
25Horn claims that crucially, no distinction between contradictory and contrary nega-
tion was regularly made within classical Indian logic. ([10], p. 80) However, the contrary
or contradictory feature of a negation crucially depends upon the nature of the subject
in a predication: are the subjects of a Jain predication sometimes universal, sometimes
particular? No deﬁnite answer seems to be available to disentangle the meaning of 4CN;
it is only the later school of Navya-Ny	aya that will deal with such equivocation cases. See
in this respect J. Ganeri: Towards a formal regimentation of the Navya-Ny	aya technical
language (parts I,II), in Logic, Navya-Ny	aya and Applications (Homage to Bimal Krishna
Matilal), M.K. Chakraborti and Löwe, B. and Mitra M.N. and Sarukkai S (eds.), College
Publications, London, 2008, pp. 105-121.
26The alleged founder of 4CN, Sañjaya (' 6th century B.C.), would have inﬂuenced
the Greek philosopher Pyrrho in his radical skepticism; Raju states this point by claiming
that Pyrrho maintained that `I am not only not certain of the knowledge of any object,
but also not certain that I am not certain of such a knowledge'  ([16], p. 695). It is
worthwhile to note that the Greek principle of indiﬀerence ou mallon (not any more than)
strikingly parallels 4CN.
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a mere denial without any positive counterpart. The positive basis of each
Jaina statement included a case of negative assertion, as witnessed by the
predication (2); but no such assertion arises in 4CN, where negation is pure
denial. Before answering to whether there can be a negation without any
positive counterpart, we suspect the core diﬃculty with 4CN to lie in the
meaning of its wide scope negation (the answer No): it is used to produce a
denial, and this no-answer should ﬁnd a proper treatment within the formal
framework of QAS.
Unlike the Jaina statements, and following the connection established
between M	adhyamika skepticism and anti-realism, we assume that each kot.i
deals with the impossibility of knowledge: the human failure to catch any
absolute truth (param	arthasatya) about reality is a suﬃcient reason to deny
any justiﬁable belief and thus any truth-assignment, according to N	ag	arjuna's
s	unyav	ada. If so, we introduce a four-valued logic of acceptance and rejection
for 4CN.
DEFINITION 4. A logic of acceptance and rejection is a model AR4 =
〈M,A〉 upon a sentential language L and its set of logical connectives© =
{∼,∧,∨,→}. It includes a logical matrix M = 〈Q; 4;D〉, with :
- a function Q(α) = 〈q1(α),q2(α)〉;
- a set 4 of logical values;
- a subset of designated values D ⊆ 4, where D = {〈1, 0〉, 〈1, 1〉}.
Q(α) is an ordered set of n = 2 questions about the sentence α, with
q1: is a justiﬁably be true? and q2: is a justiﬁably false?
27, and n =
2 sorts of answers such that a(α) 7→ {0, 1}. It results in a set V of mn =
22 = 4 logical values, each standing for an explicit belief-attitude in 4 =
{〈1, 0〉, 〈1, 1〉, 〈0, 0〉, 〈0, 1〉}. The diﬀerence with J7 is that no third question
q3 occurs here: avaktavya is not a M	adhyamika concept, so that only two
basic semantic predicates or muladr.s. t.is are required in 4CN. At the same
time, AR4 is a general logic of statements that could include the Jaina
stances as well: the Jaina value 〈a1(α), a2(α), a3(α)〉 can be equated with
the value Q(α) = 〈q1(α),q2(α) of AR4 by canceling the third bha	nga a3(α).
Then 〈1, 0〉 = {〈1, 0, 1〉, 〈1, 0, 0〉}, 〈1, 1〉 = {〈1, 1, 1〉, 〈1, 1, 0〉}, and 〈0, 1〉 =
{〈0, 1, 1〉, 〈0, 1, 0〉}. A relevant exception concerns the third value 〈0, 0〉 =
{〈0, 0, 1〉, 〈0, 0, 0〉}, which includes the eighth forbidden value 〈0, 0, 0〉 in J7.
This forbidden value is our key to a better understanding of N	ag	arjuna's four
stances, with the following deﬁnition of negation and its distinction with the
speech-act of denial.
27The second question Is α justiﬁably false? is equivalent with Is ∼α justiﬁably
true?. This results in the following equation for negation in AR4: a1(∼α) = a2(α), and
conversely.
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DEFINITION 5. For every sentence α such that A(α) = 〈a1(α), a2(α)〉:
A(∼α) = 〈a2(α), a1(α)〉.
The import of QAS is to bring an algebraic distinction between logical
negation and denial: contrary to the usual perplexing presentation of 4CN,
denial should not be rendered as a connective that is part of the sentential
content α; rather, a denial is a no-answer that does not stand for a function
but its resulting value. Correspondingly, a proper formalization of 4CN is
suggested in the following style:
(a′′) a1(α) = 0
(b′′) a1(∼α) = 0
(c′′) a1(α ∧ ∼α) = 0
(d′′) a1(∼((α ∨ ∼α)) = 0
Only one valuation of AR4 accounts for the consistency of (a
′′)-(d′′),
namely: A(α) = 〈0, 0〉, the forbidden value of Jaina logic. Following the
deﬁnition of conjunction and disjunction in AR4
28, (a′′) and (b′′) entail that
a2(α) = a1(α∧ ∼α) = a1(∼(α∨ ∼α)) = a2(α ∨ ∼α) = 0.
Once again, the usual perplexity caused by N	ag	arjuna's stance is due to a
confusion between the relational and non-relational reading of negation. The
former negation (paryud	asa pratis.edha) is not an answer about whether the
sentence α is true or false, given that it occurs within its sentential content in
the whole expression ∼α; most importantly, it assumes bivalence and entails
that ∼α is false whenever α is true (and conversely). Therefore, no sentence
can be given a gappy value (neither true nor false) with such a relational use
of negation. Furthermore, introducing the intuitionistic negation ¬ for this
purpose is not the solution either: that α is said to be neither true nor false
cannot explain again why this gappy solution is insuﬃcient to account for
the fourth stance (d'). This leads to the conclusion that N	ag	arjuna's denial
should be strictly distinguished from assertive negation and be equated with
the absolutely no-answer 〈0, 0〉.
Our point about logical values actually holds for every negation, in the
sense that there is no functional diﬀerence between classical and intuitionistic
negation AR4. For the diﬀerence between the two negations does not lie in
the deﬁnition of their mapping from L to V but, rather, in the domain
of values they range over. Given that classical negation assumes a one-one
correspondence theory of truth, this entails that a sentence cannot be said
28A complete description of the semantics for AR4 is not required in the context of
4CN, but it includes maximal and minimal functions (max,min) upon the values of V ,
given a total ordering function < between these elements proceeds as follows: 〈0, 1〉 <
〈0, 0〉 < 〈1, 1〉 < 〈1, 0〉. Hence the following deﬁnition of the connectives of conjunction
and disjunction: v(α ∧ ψ) = min(α,ψ), and v(α ∨ ψ) = max (α,ψ).
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to be either both true and false or neither true nor false; hence a restriction
of the range from V = 4 to V = 2 = {〈1, 0〉, 〈0, 1〉}. As to the intuitionistic
theory of truth as justiﬁable truth, no sentence can be said to be true unless
the justiﬁcation is deﬁnite and this stringent view of justiﬁcation implies
another restriction from V = 4 to V = 3 = {〈1, 0〉, 〈0, 0〉, 〈0, 1〉}. The Jaina
case embodies a paraconsistent variant, where a sentence can be said to be
both true and false but excludes the possibility that it be none; hence a
corresponding restriction from V = 4 to V = 3 = {〈1, 0〉, 〈1, 1〉, 〈0, 1〉}. The
relative truth of nayav	ada also accounted for the combination of such basic
answers into new logical values in J7, unlike the non-relative, absolute or
one-sided view of truth in the M	adhyamika school.
But that is not the whole story of 4CN. Recalling a former quotation by
Raju, two problems remain to be solved. Firstly: does N	ag	arjuna deny abso-
lutely everything, including his own denials? And secondly: is the catus.kot.i
a mere reversal of the saptabha 
ng	, i.e. the transformation of a common set
of positive statements into negative statements?
6 Two contrary logics?
Let us note about the ﬁrst question that a distinction can be made between
two generic forms of skepticism, a moderate and a radical one. The for-
mer is closer to what the Buddhists meant by nihilism and wanted to be
strictly distinguished from; it means that nothing can be known about real-
ity, but one least thing to be known is precisely that nothing mundane can
be known. In contrast to this, the radical version goes on denying any denial
about our knowledge about reality: ignorance is not asserted but doubted
itself. Whether or not such a distinction relates to the Greek schools of the
New Academy (Arcesilas, Carneades) and Pyrrhonism (Pyrrho, Timon of
Phlius) does not really matter in what follows. Rather, the point is whether
N	ag	arjuna endorsed radical skepticism and what his rejection consisted in.
In the light of QAS, the complete denial of 4CN means that only no-answers
are given to preceding questions.
As to the second question, Bahm replies in [2] that the two Indian logics
cannot merely seen as mutual contraries: Jaina logic cannot be reduced to a
Principle of Four-Cornered Aﬃrmation. QAS already brought this point out
by the cardinality of the sets of logical values, given the essential occurrence
of a third question (about avaktavya) in J7. Nevertheless, there is a reason
to claim that these philosophical schools are really opposite to each other
in some respect. The catus.kot.i can be taken to be a reversal of saptabha 
ng	
only if the sentential content of a denial or an aﬃrmation is of the ﬁrst order,
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i.e. stands for a declarative sentence about reality; but the same cannot be
safely said for higher-order questions about the answerer's attitudes29.
Let us exemplify this symmetrical behavior by means of two Socratic dia-
logues, where an initial question about the atomic sentence p is accompanied
with a sequence of oratory questions (the questioner expects to have a given
answer) and answers. The answerer to a common questioner (the doctrinal-
ist Aristotle) is a Jaina speaker (V	adiveda S	uri) and a M	adhyamika speaker
(N	ag	arjuna), respectively. It clearly appears that the resulting dialogues are
radically opposed to each other, and we bring this out by formalizing them
in terms of QAS.
DIALOGUE 1: ARISTOTLE VS. V	ADIVEDA S	URI
1. Q: Do you accept p?
[a1(p) = 1?]
2. A: Yes, I accept p.
[a1(p) = 1]
3. Q: Therefore you reject ∼p?
[a2(p) = 0 ?]
4. A: No, I do not reject ∼p.
[a2(p) 6= 0]
5. Q: Does it mean that you also accept ∼p?
[a2(p) = 1 ?]
6. A: Yes, I also accept ∼p.
[a2(p) = 1]
7. Q: Therefore you accept p and ∼p?
[a1(p ∧ ∼p) = 1 ?]
8. A: Yes, I accept both.
[a1(p ∧ ∼p) = 1]
9. Q: Therefore you reject ∼(p ∧ ∼p)?
[a2(p ∧ ∼p) = 0 ?]
10. A: No, I don't reject ∼(p ∧ ∼p).
[a2(p ∧ ∼p) 6= 0]
11. Q: Does it mean that you also accept ∼(p ∧ ∼p)?
[a2(p ∧ ∼p) = 1 ?]
29The order of attitudes and their statements can be reformulated in terms of iterated
modalities: the statement α is an aﬃrmation and correlated belief about α, B(α); the
statement I aﬃrm that α is an aﬃrmation and correlated belief about the aﬃrmation
and correlated belief about α, B(Bα); and so on for any n-ordered statement as a sequence
of n beliefs: Bn(α). The diﬀerence between AR4 and modal logic is that iterated attitudes
are not rendered as modal operators but as logical values in the former semantics. See
note 31 below.
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12. A: Yes, I also accept ∼(p ∧ ∼p).
[a2(p ∧ ∼p) = 1]
13. Q: Therefore you reject ∼((p ∧ ∼p) ∧ ∼(p ∧ ∼p))?
[a2(((p ∧ ∼p) ∧ ∼(p ∧ ∼p))) = 0 ?]
14. A: No, I don't reject ∼((p ∧ ∼p) ∧ ∼(p ∧ ∼p)).
[a2(((p ∧ ∼p) ∧ ∼(p ∧ ∼p))) 6= 0]
15. Q: Therefore you also accept ∼((p ∧ ∼p) ∧ ∼(p ∧ ∼p))?
[a1(∼((p ∧ ∼p) ∧ ∼(p ∧ ∼p))) = 1?]
16. A: Yes, I also accept ∼((p ∧ ∼p) ∧ ∼(p ∧ ∼p))
[a1(∼((p ∧ ∼p) ∧ ∼(p ∧ ∼p))) = 1]
. . .
It emerges from this abortive maieutic that the doctrinalist questioner
fails to make the answerer his own reason: the whole answers are perfectly
rational albeit inconsistent, in the light of AR4 and its non-classical logical
values that are exclusively positive or negative30.
THEOREM 3. For every sentence α (including p, ∼p, p ∧ ∼p, ∼(p ∧ ∼p),
and so on), the answer of the Jaina in AR4 is A(α) = 〈1, 1〉.
Proof : Let us assume that a1(p ∧ ∼p) = 1; then a1(p) = a1(∼p) = a2(p) = 1.
And if a1(∼(p ∧ ∼p)) = 1 then a2(p ∧ ∼p) = 1, i.e. a2(p) = 1 or a1(∼p) = 1.
Hence for every α, a1(α) = a2(α) = 1. Hence A(α) = 〈a1(α), a2(α)〉 = 〈1, 1〉.
Let us now apply the same process to a dual dialogue between the dog-
matist questioner Aristotle and his skeptic answerer. This yields the exact
reversal of the preceding dialogue, given that each question about whether a
given sentence is accepted becomes a question about whether it is rejected.
DIALOGUE 2: ARISTOTLE VS. N	AG	ARJUNA
1. Q: Do you reject p?
[a1(p) = 0?]
2. A: Yes, I reject p.
30The semantics for AR4 can be said to be bivalent in this respect: for every answer
given to question qi about the sentence α, the corresponding answer is either positive
(ai(α) = 1) or negative (ai(α) = 0). Tertium non datur. Concerning any positive and
negative answer to one and the same question, it has been argued earlier (see note 23)
that it is equally impossible in the pluralist approach of the Jains. Hence the ensuing
diﬀerence between two grades of inconsistency in AR4: a given answer A(α) is externally
inconsistent if and only if a1(α) 6= a2(α); it is internally inconsistent or incoherent if and
only if, for any answer x in {0,1}, ai(α) = x and ai(α) 6= x. Accordingly, there is a crucial
diﬀerence between sentential inconsistency and non-sentential inconsistency (incoherence):
two sentences α and ∼α can be mutually inconsistent while the answers A(α) and A(∼α)
about them are internally consistent (coherent).
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[a1(p) = 0]
3. Q: Therefore you accept ∼p?
[a2(p) = 1 ?]
4. A: No, I do not accept ∼p.
[a2(p) 6= 1]
5. Q: Does it mean that you also reject ∼p?
[a2(p) = 0 ?]
6. A: Yes, I also reject ∼p.
[a2(p) = 0]
7. Q: Does it mean that you reject both p and ∼p?
[a1(p ∨ ∼p) = 0?]
8. Yes, I reject both p and ∼p.
[a1(p ∨ ∼p) = 0]
9. Q: Therefore you accept ∼(p ∨ ∼p)?
[a2(p ∨ ∼p) = 1 ?]
10. A: No, I do not accept ∼(p ∨ ∼p).
[a2(p ∨ ∼p) 6= 1]
11. Does it mean that you reject both (p ∨ ∼p) and ∼(p ∨ ∼p)?
[a1(((p ∨ ∼p) ∨ ∼(p ∨ ∼p))) = 0 ?]
12. A: Yes, I reject both (p ∨ ∼p) and ∼(p ∨ ∼p).
[a1(((p ∨ ∼p) ∨ ∼(p ∨ ∼p))) = 0]
13. Q: Therefore you accept ∼((p ∨ ∼p) ∨ ∼(p ∨ ∼p))?
[a2(((p ∨ ∼p) ∨ ∼(p ∨ ∼p))) = 1?]
14. A: No, I don't accept ∼((p ∨ ∼p) ∨ ∼(p ∨ ∼p)).
[a2(((p ∨ ∼p) ∨ ∼(p ∨ ∼p))) 6= 1]
15. Q: Therefore you also reject ∼((p ∨ ∼p) ∨ ∼(p ∨ ∼p))?
[a2(((p ∨ ∼p) ∨ ∼(p ∨ ∼p))) = 0?]
16. A: Yes, I also reject ∼((p ∨ ∼p) ∨ ∼(p ∨ ∼p))
[a2(((p ∨ ∼p) ∨ ∼(p ∨ ∼p))) = 0]
. . .
Again, the doctrinalist questioner failed to make the answerer his reason:
the whole is rational albeit incomplete, so long as the answerer refuses to
commit in the truth of any sentence.
THEOREM 4. For every sentence α (including p, ∼p, p ∨ ∼p, ∼(p ∨ ∼p),
and so on), the answer of the M	adhyamika in AR4 is A(α) = 〈0, 0〉.
Proof : if a1(p ∨ ∼p) = 0 then a1(p) = a1(∼p) = a2(p) = 0. And if a1(∼(p
∨ ∼p)) = 0 then a2(p ∨ ∼p) = 0, i.e. a2(p) = 0 or a1(∼p) = 0. Hence for
every α, a1(α) = a2(α) = 0. Hence A(α) = 〈a1(α), a2(α)〉 = 〈0, 0〉.
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Just as the Jains refuse exclusive acts of positive assertion and contend
themselves with inconsistent aﬃrmations, the M	adhyamikas refuse exclusive
acts of negative assertion and contend themselves with incomplete denials.
A parallel can be made here with da Costa paraconsistent logics C1-
Cn: these are non-truth-functional systems where contradictions are variably
aﬃrmed or denied according to the structural complexity of the contradictory
sentences (p and ∼p, in C0; (p ∧ ∼p) and ∼(p ∧ ∼p), in C1; and so on). By




n can be devised for the
dialectical process of 4CN and states that alternatives are variably aﬃrmed
or denied according to the structural complexity of the alternative sentences:
(p or ∼p, in C′0; (p ∨ ∼p) or ∼(p ∨ ∼p), in C′1; and so on). But the parallel
stops here, because the preceding dialogues have shown that the structural
complexity of a sentence does not change the attitude of the answerer. In
this respect, the Jains and M	adhyamikas are likely to be considered as two
contrary attitudes or judgments in the common logic of statements AR4: the
former aﬃrm everything whereas the latter deny everything.
Returning to a preceding objection, it remains to consider to what extent
such radical speakers can be said to aﬃrm everything (doxastic eclecticism)
or deny everything (doxastic nihilism) in their dialectical games31. While
the concerned texts mention dialectical games about ﬁrst-order statements
only, it hardly makes sense to contend that N	ag	arjuna would have denied his
own denials with respect to ﬁrst-order statements.
Let us make a semantic ascent and consider the second-order statement
α′: I don't aﬃrm that α (is true). A no-answer to the question q1(α′): is
α′ justiﬁably true? would mean that the answerer denies to have denied
(the truth of) α, while a yes-answer would entail that he aﬃrms to have
denied α (as he did). The same objection can be made to a universally
aﬃrmative stance in the Jains. Likewise, the Jain would hardly give an
aﬃrmative answer to α′ without refusing the truth to α and thereby violating
his policy of non-one-sidedness32. Actually, the preceding dialogues have
already made clear that the Jain did deny three times (steps 4, 10 and 14)
31N	ag	arjuna's following stance is the key to his allegedly radical skepticism: If I had
a thesis, I would be wrong. But I have no thesis. Therefore there is nothing wrong with
me. (To keep one away from the vain discussions, Number 29). What is the content of
the thesis at hand? It is likely to be a ﬁrst-order thesis, i.e. a statement about any given
state of aﬀairs. Whether N	ag	arjuna would have also claimed to have no thesis about his
own attitudes remains unclear, however.
32This leads to the reintroduction of the law of double negation in the form of an
illocutionary law of double denial : the denial of ∼α needn't entail the aﬃrmation of α,
given that a1(α) = 0 needn't entail that a2(α) = 1 (compare with A(α) = 〈0, 0〉); on the
other hand, the denial of the denial of α entails the aﬃrmation of a, given that a1(α) 6=
0 does entail that a1(α) = 1.
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while the M	adhyamika did aﬃrm ﬁve times (steps 2, 6, 8, 12, and 16).
If so, the radically opposed attitudes of the Jainas and M	adhyamikas
should ﬁnd their own limits with the sort of sentences to be questioned:
denying and aﬃrming are about the nature of reality, rather than about one's
own mental states. Such a limit of dialectic might be what Aristotle had in
mind, when he attempted to show the attitude of Heracliteus with respect to
the PNC is self-defeating. But he failed to make his point with his elenctic
strategy, locating the trouble in the propositions (aﬃrming α and aﬃrming
not-α) rather than his opponent's propositional attitudes (aﬃrming α and
not aﬃrming α). Admittedly, these Indian logics were much more concerned
with metaphysical topics and soteriological ends than having the ﬁnal word
in every yes-no answer game.
7 Conclusion
We have proposed a reconstruction of the Jaina and M	adhyamika logics by
means of a question-answer semantics. The result of such an enterprise is
a rational reading of these Indian schools through modern logical glasses,
including the logical tool of many-valuedness that presented skepticism and
pluralism as radically opposed to each other and separated by a middle view
of judgment that is Aristotle's bivalent way of doctrinalism. Many-valuedness
accounts for the seven judgments of Jaina saptabha 
ng	, while a more general
logic of attitudes displays Jaina and N	ag	arjuna's stances within a four-valued
semantics that characterizes both M	adhyamika skepticism (the value 〈0, 0〉)
and Jaina pluralism (the value 〈1, 1〉).
Above all, the main import of QAS is to pay attention to the dialectical
role of questions and answers in the Indian approach of logic: just as the
Megarics emphasized the dialogical nature of philosophical investigation in
contrast to the Aristotelian monological view of truth and falsity as transcen-
dental values, we want to keep in mind that the Indian logicians introduced
their statements in the form of answers to speculative questions. Jaina meta-
physical pluralism also made sense of their inconsistent judgments, while the
skeptic ﬂavor of N	ag	arjuna's philosophy explains his systematic denial to any
question about the nature of reality.
Last, but not least: one of the most intriguing case studies has con-
cerned the meaning of avaktavya (non-assertibility), the third basic judg-
ment of Jaina logic. This predicate should not be confused with common
self-contradiction, where a sentence and its negation are said to be both true
at once and in the same respect. The commentators frequently claimed that
the Jainas subscribed to PNC in their various reasonings: so non-assertibility
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refers to another, milder view of contradiction than coexistence of incompat-
ible properties in the same subject. Rather, we support Tripathi's interpre-
tation of avaktavya in the sense of non-distinction: the Jaina third judgment
might mean that some objects (S) cannot be predicated by any property,
that is, neither of one of them (P) or any of their complementaries (not-P).
Rather than a plea for self-contradiction, avaktavya seems to argue for the
impossibility to predicate anything of some such absolute subjects as 	atman
or Brahman because these would stand beyond any set of deﬁnite properties.
Such a tentative explanation would match with the Hegelian alternative pro-
cess of Aufhebung (or sursumption), in contrast to the predicative process
of subsumption that systematically describes a subject S as falling under a
given set of properties P33.
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